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This paper by Professor Harry G. Johnson
of the University of Chicago was prepared
originally for a Conference of University
Professors sponsored by the American Bank-
ers Association, which took place in Prince-
ton, N.J., on August 29-September 2,1964.
Because the subject matter is of special
A DISCUSSION of major issues in monetary
and fiscal policies of the United States seem-
ingly should be restricted to the domestic
aspects of the subject and should take the
international environment as given. Such
restraint, however, seems to be intolerably
confining.
In my opinion the major issue in monetary
and fiscal policy in the United States at the
interest to students of monetary and banking
processes, the BULLETIN'S editors are pro-
viding here for its publication. BULLETIN
publication, however, denotes neither agree-
ment nor disagreement with the views ex-
pressed by the author; these are solely his
responsibility.
present time is the shape that the interna-
tional monetary system should take. Further-
more, the decisions—or failures to take de-
cisions—on this subject that have emerged
from the deliberations of the International
Monetary Fund [1] and of the Group of Ten
[2] are bound to constitute a source of fu-




THE DEFICIENCIES OF FIXED
EXCHANGE RATES
The classical debate on the issue of fixed
versus floating exchange rates, which took
the existence of the nation-state for granted,
produced a theoretically overwhelming case
for floating exchange rates, given the initial
assumption that national policy-makers can
be trusted to pursue domestic objectives in
a sensible fashion. The classical statement
of this case is Milton Friedman's essay on
the subject. [3]
More recent works by Robert A. Mundell
[4] and Ronald I. McKinnon [5] have aban-
doned the earlier identification of a nation
with a particular currency area and have
posed the question of fixed versus floating
exchange rates as a problem of choosing the
optimum currency area. These authors have
raised important questions about the assump-
tions of the earlier analysis, notably with re-
spect to the diversity of the economy and
the internal mobility of its factors of produc-
tion, the degree of involvement of the econ-
omy in international trade, and the relation
of the "moneyness" of the national currency
to the international mobility of capital.
In spite of the questions it has raised, this
new theorizing has strengthened the reasons
for believing that the United States should
1 Numbers in brackets refer to references cited on
p. 1413.
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have a floating exchange rate for the dollar
in relation to other major world currencies.
It has done this by calling attention to the
importance of internal mobility of factors of
production for the facility of adjustment un-
der floating rates; to the effects of a low ratio
of international trade to national income—
such as we have in this country—in reducing
the impact of changes in exchange rates on
the domestic price level, and so in minimiz-
ing the conflict between the balance of pay-
ments objective and the price-stability ob-
jective of economic policy; and to the effects
of a diversified domestic economy in en-
couraging capital to flow internationally in
response to changes in exchange rates and
to the effects of such changes on the profit-
ability of investment.
Nevertheless, the United States has be-
come increasingly committed to the present
system of fixed rates of exchange between
the various currencies and a fixed price of
gold. These rates are alterable only in cir-
cumstances of "fundamental disequilib-
rium," and for the major countries at least,
the circumstances that would seem to reflect
such disequilibrium have been redefined
down to the vanishing point. This system of
international monetary organization, under
present conditions and given the policy ob-
jectives of the major nations, is seriously de-
fective in a variety of respects.
Current analysis has come to list these
deficiencies under three major headings: (1)
The long-run liquidity problem. This is asso-
ciated with the present level of the price of
gold and with the inadequacy of new mone-
tary supplies of that precious metal. (2) The
confidence problem. This arises from the
scarcity of gold, the use of the dollar as a
substitute reserve, and the international mo-
bility of capital that has developed, par-
ticularly since the European currencies be-
came convertible and the United States
became a chronic deficit country. And (3)
the problem of adjustment to international
disequilibria [6].
THE MECHANISM OF INTERNATIONAL
ADJUSTMENT
In this paper I shall not be concerned with
the first two of these problems since they
do not pose direct and concrete problems for
fiscal and monetary policy. This statement
needs to be qualified, however. That is, one
must recognize that the confidence problem
imposes restraints on the freedom of the
United States to follow any policies that
would be expansionary for the domestic
economy if such policies would have adverse
effects on the balance of payments. The
reality and irksomeness of such restraints
are evident from James Tobin's recent article
in the Review of Economics and Statistics
symposium in honor of Seymour Harris [7].
Also, the confidence problem obliges the
U.S. monetary authorities to pay particular
attention to outflows of U.S. short-term capi-
tal, in order to avoid alarming foreign central
banks.
Under the gold standard system of im-
mutably fixed exchange rates propounded in
textbooks, adjustment of international pay-
ments disequilibria would occur automati-
cally. It would be brought about by changes
in domestic expenditures and prices, induced
by contraction of the money supply in def-
icit countries and by expansion of the money
supply in surplus countries. Such monetary
changes would be initiated automatically by
international gold flows, and reinforced by
domestic monetary policies rigidly governed
by national gold reserves.
Under the present system the operation of
this mechanism is impeded in two ways. One
impediment is the downward inflexibility of
wages and prices—the recognition of which
in the 1930's led economists to denounce the
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gold standard. The other is the unwillingness
of governments—motivated by the objec-
tives of price stability, full employment, and
economic growth—to tolerate and pursue
the adjustment processes required by the sys-
tem. Deficit countries are reluctant to de-
flate, and surplus countries reluctant to in-
flate, as the adjustment processes require.
Adjustment of disequilibria, in the funda-
mental sense of the term "adjustment," has
therefore come to depend on two crucial fac-
tors.
The first is the inability of the countries
concerned to achieve their stated policy ob-
jectives: specifically, the inability of deficit
countries to pursue the goal of full employ-
ment, or their willingness to accept a per-
formance short of that desired, for the sake
of improving their balances of payments;
and the inability of surplus countries to pre-
vent their surpluses from generating domes-
tic inflation, contrary to the objective of
price stability.
The second factor is the response of the
competitive system to the existence of dis-
equilibrium and to the residual deflationary
and inflationary pressures allowed by the in-
complete fulfillment of policy objectives.
Note that I have described this factor in such
a way as to allow for processes of adjustment
that do not depend on direct aggregate de-
mand pressures; these processes may involve
such elements as productivity-increasing in-
novations prompted by the micro-economic
pressures of competition that are not allowed
for in macro-economic models. Note also
that the competitive response may involve
perverse elements, particularly the tendency
for private capital to flow from depressed to
prosperous economies.
Dependence on these factors means that
the adjustment of fundamental disequilib-
ria is bound to be a slow process. The ex-
perience of the dollar-shortage period and
of the ensuing dollar-glut period, combined
with the projections of the Brookings Report
[8], suggests that an adjustment period might
run from 10 to 15 years.
An adjustment period of this prospective
length poses extremely serious problems for
the formation and execution of economic
policy: In the first place, it requires a much
longer perspective than democratic govern-
ments are equipped to adopt, bound as they
are to seek electoral approval every 4 or 5
years, and focusing as they must on short-
run economic developments. Much of the
confusion, misunderstanding, and mutual
recrimination that has impeded improvement
in the international monetary system and in
international economic relations in the post-
war period can be attributed to the persistent
but mistaken belief that problems of inter-
national monetary disequilibrium could be
remedied by appropriate policies in a brief
space of time.
In the second place, the financing of defi-
cits cumulated over such long periods of
time requires massive transfers of capital
among countries. The usual facilities of cen-
tral banks are not adequate to handle such
large transfers, so it becomes necessary to ar-
range them by intergovernmental negotia-
tion. And this raises a variety of difficult
political problems for which solutions must
still be found. While events in recent years
have been pressing toward the use of inter-
governmental transfers of long-term capital
explicitly for the financing of international
disequilibria, such transfers have not yet
been recognized officially as essential to the
logic of the system. I should note, in pass-
ing, that a system of slow international ad-
justment supported by large-scale transfers
of capital from surplus to deficit countries
raises some obvious questions about the effi-
ciency of the resulting international alloca-
tion of capital.
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POLICIES FOR INTERNATIONAL BALANCE
In Mundell's terminology the present in-
ternational monetary system is, in fact, a
"disequilibrium system" [9]. The attempt
in such a system to devise policies that will
aid in the pursuit of the accepted policy goals
—price stability, full employment, and
growth—has led policy-makers and theorists
alike into new and more complex ideas as
to how policy should be conducted. These
ideas are concerned with achieving the sem-
blance of balance of payments adjustment
in the short run, with the hope that in the
long run a real adjustment will be brought
about through the automatic competitive
processes previously mentioned.
One method of achieving this effect—and
this has already been referred to—is through
negotiated intergovernmental transfers of
longer-term capital.
Another method, which has become in-
creasingly respectable in recent years, is to
vary the degree of government interference
in international trade and payments. For the
deficit country—to wit, the United States—
this method comprises the tying of foreign
aid and military expenditures and the in-
troduction of the interest equalization tax
on the payments side; on the receipts side,
it includes the negotiation of military sales
to allies and envisages a variety of special
incentives to increase exports.
For surplus countries seeking balance of
payments adjustments through policies af-
fecting trade and payments, it is recom-
mended that resistance to the inflationary
consequences of surpluses be sought in a
liberalization of import policy rather than
by tightening the supply of money. The ap-
peal of this recommendation is usually en-
hanced (as in the Report of the Council of
Economic Advisers submitted in January
1964 [10]) by a deliberate refusal to endorse
the converse proposition for deficit coun-
tries, or even to recognize that the policies
actually followed by the United States do
represent its converse.
The third method is to select a combina-
tion of fiscal and monetary policies that will
permit a high level of employment without
aggravating the balance of payments situa-
tion. In terms of the simplest Keynesian
theory of economic policy, if fiscal expansion
is not accompanied by monetary expansion,
the current-account balance will tend to
worsen because rising income will increase
the demand for imports. But at the same time
the balance on capital account will tend to
improve because rising income will tend to
raise interest rates and attract capital inflows,
or discourage outflows. Monetary expansion
will tend to worsen the balance on current
account through its effect on income and to
worsen the capital-account balance through
its effect on interest rates, whereas monetary
contraction will tend to improve the balance
of payments on both accounts. Hence it
should be possible to combine fiscal expan-
sion with monetary policy in such a way as
to raise income while improving the capital
account enough to offset the adverse effect
of higher income on the current account.
The required monetary policy will prob-
ably be a contractionary one, involving
either an actual reduction in the quantity
of money, or a slower rate of growth of the
money supply than normal. It is possible,
however, that this policy would be expan-
sionary if the income effect of the fiscal ex-
pansion on the current account fell short of
its interest effect on the capital account. In
any case it would have to be "contraction-
ary" in the different sense of involving an
increase in interest rates.
It is important to notice, for future ref-
erence, that the theory leading to this com-
bination of policies for internal and external
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balance rests on very simple and possibly
questionable Keynesian assumptions: specif-
ically, if an increase in the level of income
were to raise prospects for profits, monetary
expansion could lead to a rise rather than a
decline in interest rates. If so, it would have
effects on the two parts of the balance of
payments similar to those associated with
fiscal expansion.
The policy analysis I have just outlined
suggests fiscal expansion combined with
monetary restraint for countries with deficits
in their balance of payments, and fiscal re-
straint combined with monetary expansion
(or at least not monetary restraint) for coun-
tries with surpluses. The fact that such a
recommendation was made explicit to sur-
plus countries in the 1964 report by the
Council of Economic Advisers [10] no doubt
stems in part from the reaction of the Eu-
ropean central banks to the increase in U.S.
interest rates early in the summer of 1963,
when there was still some tendency to as-
sume that the European countries would re-
spond passively to the U.S. policy actions.
A further wrinkle of the analysis, which
in U.S. policy predates the argument out-
lined, recommends that the deficit country
use monetary policy in such a way as to raise
short-term rates relative to long—that is,
to "twist" the rate structure—with the pur-
pose of attracting short-term capital inflows
or inhibiting outflows while not discouraging
long-term domestic investment. So far as
I am aware, this part of the analysis has not
been crystalized into a policy recommenda-
tion for surplus countries, though in some
cases their policies have been designed to
discourage short-term capital inflows by
equivalent means.
The policies of fiscal expansion combined
with higher interest rates in deficit countries
and of fiscal contraction combined with
lower interest rates in surplus countries just
described are not fundamentally designed
to restore international equilibrium. Rather
they are designed to induce whatever trans-
fers of capital are necessary for financing the
deficits or surpluses associated with the pur-
suit of full employment and price stability
in an environment of disequilibrium in ex-
change rates to pass through the private capi-
tal accounts of the balance of payments. In
this way they seek to relieve the strains on
the international monetary system and on
intergovernmental relations that financing by
central bank accumulations of the curren-
cies of the deficit countries or by negotiated
intergovernmental capital transfers entail.
The utility of such policies is conditional
on the presence of a competitive adjustment
mechanism working steadily (if slowly) be-
hind the scenes. Their use is not only open
to the questions about efficiency of capital
allocation mentioned earlier but also condi-
tional on their not impeding the underlying
adjustment mechanism. The danger that they
may impede adjustment is, of course, re-
flected in concern about the possibility of
inflation; in wishful (and wistful) contem-
plation of an income policy (wage and price
guideposts); and in government actions
aimed at offsetting the influence of disequi-
librium in exchange rates on the country's
international competitive position by sub-
sidies to productivity-increasing activities
and by export promotion.
In one important sense, indeed, these bal-
ance of payments policies may work directly
to aggravate international imbalance: for in-
sofar as tight or loose monetary policies have
an influence on domestic rates of growth,
this method of preserving the semblance of
international balance will accelerate the
growth of the surplus countries and will re-
tard that of the deficit countries. And inso-
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far as international competitiveness is de-
pendent on growth rates, it will tend to pro-
mote imbalance rather than balance.
The two connections assumed here, how-
ever, are doubtful: for fiscal policy can be
designed to discriminate between investment
and consumption, while the effects of growth
on international competitiveness depend on
the outcome of income and substitution ef-
fects.
To my mind, one of the major issues with
respect to fiscal and monetary policies in the
contemporary world concerns how far the
two in combination can be used to operate
the international disequilibrium system with-
out aggravating and prolonging the disequi-
libria, and without indirectly fostering the
need for, and the growth of, interferences
with both international trade and payments,
and domestic wage and price determination.
Domestic Issues in Monetary and Fiscal Policies
THE SHIFT TO FISCAL POLICY
Having said this much about the interna-
tional monetary system and the problems
involved in the use of fiscal and monetary
policy to operate it, let me turn to the con-
sideration of monetary and fiscal policy
from the domestic point of view.
The emergence of the United States as
a reserve-currency country with a chronic
balance of payments deficit has forced a
major change in the conception of the re-
spective roles of fiscal and monetary instru-
ments in carrying out U.S. economic policy.
This change is more apparent in the succes-
sive annual reports of the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers than in the views and atti-
tudes of the general public. At some cost in
terms of longer-run historical accuracy,
notably with respect to the early 1930's, it
can be said that the United States in the past
has relied in large part on monetary policy
as its major instrument for achieving price
stability and high employment. While fiscal
policy has been used from time to time since
the beginning of the New Deal, and espe-
cially during World War II, for the pursuit
of macro-economic objectives, the prolonged
period of dollar shortage prevented any seri-
ous conflict between the objectives of inter-
nal and external balance and made it un-
necessary to work out a coherent and pub-
licly accepted philosophy of the coordinated
use of fiscal and monetary policy. In par-
ticular, it was not necessary to educate the
public, including the legislators, in the use
of fiscal policy to achieve short-run economic
stability.
But with the appearance of a chronic def-
icit and balance of payments problem, it
was no longer possible to use monetary pol-
icy for purely domestic purposes. Instead,
monetary policy has had to be governed
increasingly by the requirements of the bal-
ance of payments, and especially by the need
to control international capital movements.
Correspondingly, it has become necessary to
put increasing emphasis on fiscal policy as
the primary instrument for accomplishing
domestic objectives.
PROBLEMS AND REQUIREMENTS OF THE
TRANSITION
The transition has not been without strain.
Nor is it yet complete. One aspect of the
strains involved has been the continued
criticism of Federal Reserve policies by econ-
omists and others who have been dissatisfied
with the performance of the domestic econ-
omy but who have been unwilling—or have
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refused—to recommend alternatives to
monetary stringency as a way of coping with
the balance of payments deficit. In other
words, many professionals have continued to
think of monetary policy as a purely domes-
tic instrument in circumstances in which it
cannot be so.
A more important aspect was the long
delay in getting the tax cut through Congress
and the need ultimately to sell it by the
promise of government economy, both of
which reflected the attachment of important
sections of the public and of the Congress
to orthodox notions of the necessity of bal-
anced budgeting. While it is true that the
apparent success of the tax cut has enabled
the President to promise further tax cuts in
the near future without exciting anything
like the degree of opposition encountered
before the recent tax bill was passed, there
is certainly no proof that the country has
mastered and accepted the theory of counter-
cyclical fiscal policy.
I would maintain, on the contrary, that
one of the major issues in monetary and fis-
cal policy in this country at the present time
is the development of conscious public ac-
ceptance and official use of fiscal policy as a
countercyclical device. It is one thing to con-
cur in a tax cut after years of preaching by a
conservative press that taxes are too high,
and to do so after paying appropriate lip-
service to the need for economy in govern-
ment spending. It is quite another to set up
machinery allowing the administration to cut
taxes without a gesture in the direction of
cutting spending, and to allow the adminis-
tration to do so on the basis of its own judg-
ment of what the economy requires. And it
would be a still more demanding test to em-
power the administration to raise taxes when
it felt that fiscal restraint was necessary to
prevent inflationary developments.
To put the problem in another way, the
tax cut has been only a first, and a relatively
easy, step toward the efficient use of fiscal
policy as a major instrument of domestic
economic stabilization. The next step re-
quired is one that would give the budgeting
authority discretionary control of fiscal pol-
icy. Such control would be comparable to
the discretionary control that the monetary
authority has long enjoyed over the money
supply. This will be a difficult step. One
reason is that it will be necessary to establish
the idea of countercyclical fiscal policy as
an operating principle of public finance. An-
other is that the step will require either a
surrender of some congressional control over
the taxing power or a revolutionary change
in the methods by which Congress conducts
fiscal business.
The former appears to be the more prob-
able avenue of change. At the technical
level, it would require the selection of those
taxes whose variation will have the most
predictable and substantial effects on ex-
penditures—a matter important both for the
use of tax variation as a policy instrument
and for the feasibility of transfer of power
over taxes from legislative to executive con-
trol—and the framing of rules for discretion-
ary variation in tax rates that would be ade-
quate to the needs of policy-making with-
out departing too far from the principle of
separation of powers in the Government of
the United States.
As a preliminary, it would probably be
necessary—and would be desirable on other
grounds—to effect the rationalization of the
tax structure that the experts have been urg-
ing for years but that was sacrificed in the
pursuit of over-all reduction in taxes. It
would also be helpful to keep the macro-
economic impact of the tax-expenditure
structure in the forefront of the discussion,
as the Council of Economic Advisers did in
its report for January 1964 [10], with a view
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to more frequent adjustment of tax rates to
the increasing yield potentials created by the
growth of the economy.
SPECIFIC ISSUES OF MONETARY
AND FISCAL POLICY
General Effectiveness
Let me now turn from the broad issues
raised for the deployment of the instruments
of fiscal and monetary policy by recent
changes in the world monetary environment
and the international position of the U.S.
economy to some of the more specific issues
that have been raised by the use of these
instruments in recent years.
It will be generally agreed, I think, that
one issue has been conclusively settled by
recent experience. This is the capacity of
fiscal and monetary policy, in cooperation,
to raise the level of economic activity and to
reduce the level of unemployment. The cur-
rent expansion has continued longer than
any previous expansion in this century. In-
deed, it shows no clear indications of an
early relapse, but rather of continuation at
least into 1965. It has truly confounded
those who believe that a "natural" business
cycle is inevitable and that economic policy
can exercise no major influence over it. The
expansion has exceeded the forecasts. It has
reduced the budget deficit below the level
that had been predicted. And it has permitted
the administration to hold out the promise of
further tax cuts next year, earlier than could
have been expected.
The unemployment rate has fallen to 4.9
per cent, and this without any serious up-
ward pressure on prices. This last fact is of
special importance, in view of the hypothesis
so widely advanced in recent years that eco-
nomic policy has been faced with an entirely
new problem—that of structural unemploy-
ment caused by automation. Traditional
macro-economic policies, it was alleged,
were incapable of coping with this problem.
The evidence presented in support of this
hypothesis was usually no more than the ob-
servation that a rise in unemployment has a
differential impact on different sectors of the
labor force, and it should be noted that em-
pirical research on the problem has tended
to reject the hypothesis as uncorroborated
by the evidence [11].
The recent reduction in the unemploy-
ment rate provides much more direct and
convincing evidence against the hypothesis.
But it is not likely that this evidence will con-
vince those who are overly impressed by the
labor-saving effects of technical progress and
who are unable to appreciate the capacity
of a buoyant labor market to reabsorb dis-
placed labor: indeed, a group calling itself
the Ad Hoc Committee on the Triple Rev-
olution has been making a great splash in
Chicago recently with the notion that cyber-
nation—not automation; that term is old-
fashioned—threatens unemployment in the
near future on a scale so great as to demand
both the public revision of incomes to a
large part of the labor force and the redefini-
tion of the term "work" to include education,
voluntary political activity, and social wel-
fare work [12].
To argue that the recent reduction in the
unemployment rate demonstrates the efficacy
of macro-economic policies is not, of course,
to argue that the present level of unemploy-
ment is satisfactory. Still less does it imply
that there is no need for policies to improve
the mobility of labor, if lower levels of un-
employment are to be achieved with reason-
able price stability. Nor does it imply that
unemployment policy will be free of prob-
lems in the future, especially those associated
with the impending flood of new entrants
to the labor market; however, it does suggest
that macro-economic policy, properly man-
aged, can make a greater contribution to the
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solution of those problems than most non-
economist commentators on automation,
education, and related phenomena seem to
believe. Finally, it does not imply that we
have no need for a program to deal with
problems stemming from poverty, since the
roots of most poverty lie in one form or
other of incapacity to participate in the labor
force, or to provide labor services valuable
enough to earn a socially decent wage.
Relative Effectiveness: Fiscal
Versus Monetary Policy
While recent experience demonstrates the
efficacy of fiscal and monetary policy in
stimulating aggregate demand and employ-
ment, it raises the issue of the relative con-
tributions of fiscal and monetary policy to
the expansion. And this issue in turn involves
perennial and deeper questions concerning
the importance of money and the effective-
ness of monetary policy.
A variety of factors make it difficult to
interpret the experience of the past few
years. One of these relates to the changes
in Regulation Q in 1962 and 1963. These
changes, designed to allow rates on time and
savings deposits to rise enough to attract and
hold short-term capital, caused these de-
posits to rise much faster than demand de-
posits and currency. The possibilities of sub-
stitution between demand and time deposits
on the one hand, and between time and sav-
ings deposits and competing savings media
provided by other financial intermediaries
on the other hand, in response to the rise
in deposit rates, make it impossible to de-
termine exactly how expansionary monetary
policy has been over the period, according
to quantity theory standards. Such a deter-
mination would require a more detailed
analysis of the magnitudes of the relevant
cross-effects than is currently available.
If the question is approached in terms of
movements in interest rates, other complica-
tions are encountered. One of particular
relevance is the effect of the new deprecia-
tion guidelines and investment tax credit
adopted in 1962 in raising the net return on
investment, and so in effect making any given
level of long-term interest rates less restric-
tive than before. E. M. Bernstein has es-
timated the effects of these changes as equiv-
alent to a reduction of 1 percentage point
in interest rates.
2
Another is the standard point that the
restrictiveness of a given level of interest
rates varies with the circumstances. The im-
portance of this point has been emphasized
in certain theoretical papers that have
reached me recently in advance of publica-
tion and that have been written with the
current policy situation in view.
3
Essentially, these papers question the
standard diagrammatic assumption that the
investment-saving (IS) curve slopes down-
ward, so that monetary expansion necessar-
ily reduces interest rates. The contrary as-
sumption that the IS curve slopes upward
can be reached by a variety of routes: (1)
an income-investment relation stronger than
the income—saving relation; (2) a static
translation of the accelerator; (3) the appli-
cation of marginal productivity theory to the
effects of increased employment on the
marginal productivity of capital in an aggre-
gated Keynesian model; (4) the application
of the relation between relative production
quantities and factor prices in a two-goods
model on the assumption that the capital
goods sector is capital-intensive. And this
assumption implies both that monetary ex-
pansion will raise interest rates and that the
effort to stabilize interest rates in the face
2 This information was obtained in private conserva-
tion with Mr. Bernstein.
3 The authors in question are David Meiselman, R.
A. Mundell, and Arnold Collery.
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of shifts in the IS curve will be destabilizing.
Even without the assumption of an up-
ward-sloping IS curve, the effort to stabilize
rates may involve substantial expansion of
the money supply, depending on the inter-
est-sensitivity of the IS curve. And it may
well be that both the critics and the defenders
of recent monetary policy, in their concen-
tration on interest rates, have been misled
into understating the expansiveness of mone-
tary policy and overstating the restraints im-
posed on it by balance of payments consid-
erations.
In explaining changes in the U.S. econ-
omy in recent years, the 1964 report of the
Council of Economic Advisers [10] gives
the impression of assigning relatively greater
weight to tax reductions and a lesser and
complementary role to monetary policy con-
ducted, as it has been, within the limits set
by the policy of raising short-term rates and
twisting the yield structure to reduce out-
flows of short-term capital.
Milton Friedman, on the other hand, in
reporting on his research in the 44th annual
report of the National Bureau of Economic
Research [13], demonstrates that in the
period 1957-63 there was a fairly close con-
nection between rates of change in the money
supply (on the standard and his own defini-
tions of money) and subsequent rates of
change in the index of industrial production,
when the changes in each series were calcu-
lated for homogeneous subperiods. This dem-
onstration indicates that the otherwise mys-
terious slackening of the pace of economic
expansion in the latter part of 1962, which
is difficult to explain in terms of fiscal devel-
opments, appears to have been linked to a
reduction earlier that year in the rate of
growth of the money stock. The comparative
timing of these changes also makes them dif-
ficult to explain in terms of a response of
the money supply to prior changes in in-
come.
In view of this evidence, of the considera-
tions previously outlined, and of a variety
of other evidence not worth citing in detail,
I am inclined to attach a greater importance
to monetary policy in generating and sus-
taining the expansion than the Council does,
though I would not be prepared to accept
the monetary explanation of growth in eco-
nomic activity to the point of denying that
fiscal policy was an important influence on
income and employment. But while I be-
lieve that monetary policy was an important
influence, I am not convinced that the mone-
tary stimulation that has occurred has been
fully intended. There is reason to suspect
that it has been, to some extent, the un-
intended consequence of a policy intended
to be modestly restrictive in the sense of
raising the level of interest rates, but one
that actually turned out to be quite expan-
sionary in its effects on the money supply.
Effectiveness of the "twist"
A related but subsidiary question about re-
cent monetary policy relates to the effective-
ness of the policy of twisting the rate struc-
ture. This issue involves the broader question
of the empirical validity of the liquidity-pref-
erence theory. When this policy was initi-
ated, the results of contemporary research
suggested that changes in the composition
of the public debt would have relatively
trivial effects on interest rates. In fact, David
Meiselman's work on the expectations
theory of term structure implied that it
would be negligible [14]. Meiselman's work
has since been found defective by R. Kessel
[15] and John H. Wood [16], who have dis-
covered some evidence of liquidity prefer-
ence.
Meanwhile, the twist policy has appar-
ently had more influence on the rate struc-
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ture than was earlier predicted for it. A re-
cently completed doctoral dissertation by
Neil Wallace [17], which attempts to com-
bine term-structure theory with liquidity
preference in a more general theory of for-
ward interest rates, finds that the term struc-
ture has been twisted to a greater extent
than the liquidity-preference element in his
formulation would predict. As a result of
the balance of payments problem, this ques-
tion of the manipulatability of the yield
structure has gained new significance, and
further research is evidently called for. A
plausible line of explanation, but one difficult
to explore, is that Federal Reserve policy
pronouncements have a direct effect on the
market's expectations.
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE: INDEPENDENCE AND
COMPETENCE
The issues just discussed relate to the
potency of monetary policy as an instrument,
first, for controlling aggregate demand, and
second, for achieving differential effects on
the pattern of interest rates. Issues of quite
a different kind have been raised by the per-
formance and pronouncements of the Fed-
eral Reserve in the period since 1957. These
issues relate to the control over the monetary
instrument, as contrasted with the control
of that instrument over the economy, and are
concerned with two broad questions, which
may be loosely described as the external and
the internal aspects of control over monetary
policy.
By the external aspect I mean the question
of coordination of monetary policy with the
other instruments of policy—fiscal policy
and debt management. This is really a ques-
tion of the external relation of the Federal
Reserve System to the other agencies of eco-
nomic policy-making and more broadly to
the political processes of government. By
the internal aspect I mean the question of
the efficiency with which the Federal Reserve
manages monetary policy in pursuit of the
objectives of that policy. This is really a
question of the internal organization and
operating procedures of the System.
The former is in essence a political prob-
lem or a problem in political organization.
The latter is a problem on which economic
theory and scientific economic research can
be brought to bear—and in fact have re-
cently been brought to bear. But it too is
ultimately a political problem—or perhaps
it would be more accurately described as a
sociological problem. The economist does
not have the skills to provide the answers to
these problems, but in view of his alternative
role as a political economist, he is naturally
concerned with them.
These issues became active as a result of
the Federal Reserve System's adoption of a
sharply contractionary monetary policy in
1959-60 and of the resulting premature
choking-off of the recovery from the 1957-
58 recession. At that stage, I think it is fair
to say, the major part of the professional
comment was directed at the first issue. The
Federal Reserve was widely criticized for
being too concerned about resisting inflation
and for having too little concern for pro-
moting full employment and growth. And it
was generally believed that the constitution
of the System needed to be revised to give
the administration a stronger and tighter
control over the formulation and conduct of
monetary policy.
While some commentators directed their
criticisms at the System's methods rather
than at its objectives, they were very much
in a minority. And it was the majority view
that found expression in the report of the
Commission on Money and Credit [18]. The
report's discussion of the potentialities of
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monetary policy was bland and conven-
tional; and the report made extensive recom-
mendations for reforming the constitution
of the Federal Reserve System, without pay-
ing much attention to how the System ac-
tually operates policy.
The issues have recently been thrashed
out again, in the Hearings before the Sub-
Committee on Domestic Finance of the Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency of the
House of Representatives on "The Federal
Reserve System After Fifty Years" [19].
These Hearings were in many respects an
odd production, in which the popular con-
cern about the monopoly power of the
money trust inherited from the late nine-
teenth century confronted the mid-twentieth
century professional economists' concern
about the failure of the country's central
banking arrangements to apply sophisticated
new developments in monetary theory. The
two concerns found very uncertain common
ground in an onslaught on the independence
of the Federal Reserve in the Governmental
structure and on its organization and meth-
ods of performing its functions.
In contrast to the proceedings of the Com-
mission on Money and Credit, the purpose of
the Hearings has been deliberately to en-
courage the airing of criticisms of the Fed-
eral Reserve—and criticisms have been re-
corded in abundance. The Keynesians have
had their revenge on the System for the
monetary policies of 1959-60. And the
quantity theorists have had their revenge on
both the System and the Keynesians for past
insults and neglect.
Moreover, the quantity theorists' attack
has been extended beyond past charges of
ignorance of how money influences the
economy—charges based on recent research
on the theory of the demand for money—to
charges of ignorance of how the System it-
self influences money. These charges are
based on still more recent research on the
theory of the supply of money.
Here I refer not to the Hearings them-
selves, but to the staff study by Karl Brunner
and Allan Meltzer on "The Federal Re-
serve's Attachment to the Free Reserve Con-
cept" [20]. This study follows earlier works
by Alexander J. Meigs [21] and William G.
Dewald [22], which pinpointed the fallacies
of the theory of monetary control originated
by Winfield W. Riefler [23] and underlined
the inadequacies of this theory as a guide
to the conduct of monetary control.
The result of the Hearings has been to
dramatize both the unpopularity of the Fed-
eral Reserve System and its methods with a
large number of monetary economists and
the extent to which it has lost touch with
new developments in monetary theory and
new empirical research on monetary phe-
nomena. The report of the Commission on
Money and Credit [18] and the discussions
of monetary policy surrounding it had al-
ready revealed the gap between the Federal
Reserve and the academic economists. But
the Hearings—and especially the threat of
legislation emanating from Representative
Patman's Committee—are undoubtedly the
main influence behind the efforts that Chair-
man Martin has recently initiated to mod-
ernize the Federal Reserve System.
As already mentioned, there are two dis-
tinct issues involved here, the external and
the internal. So far as the first is concerned,
I would judge that few economists now
would be prepared to advocate an "inde-
pendent" central bank, as propounded in
the literature published between the two
World Wars; that is, a bank whose first duty
is to protect the value of money against the
inflationary propensities of the elected politi-
cians. Such a function is consistent with
neither political democracy nor modern con-
cepts of the economic responsibilities of gov-
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ernment. And even if it were, the historical
record provides little evidence of the capac-
ity of central banks to perform it wisely
[24]. However, there are some subtle issues
relating to precisely how the central bank
should be integrated into the organization
of the government's economic policy-mak-
ing, and specifically whether the central bank
should be coordinate with the Treasury un-
der the executive department, or should be
subordinate to the Treasury.
In Canada this issue was recently decided
in favor of making the Governor of the Bank
responsible to the Minister of Finance, with
the latter determining the broad outlines of
monetary policy. This is the system that has
ruled in England since 1945. Such a system
of organization assumes that the Treasury
makes macro-economic policy.
In this country, however, there is histori-
cal reason to fear that the Treasury might be
excessively concerned with minimizing the
interest cost of the public debt. This problem
is part of a larger problem mentioned earlier:
the need to develop among our people, in-
cluding the legislative and executive
branches of government themselves, a better
understanding of the techniques and implica-
tions of fiscal policy.
With regard to the second issue—the ap-
plication of modern economic theory and
scientific research methods in the conduct of
monetary policy—it is worth making the
obvious point that the problem is not to get
the central bank to employ and use econ-
omists. The Federal Reserve has done that
for a long time, as have most other central
banks. The real problem, which has close
analogies with the problem of the use of
scientists in industry, or ©f economists in
economic planning, is to establish and main-
tain an organizational structure within which
a scientific and research-oriented approach
can be maintained in the face of the con-
tinual pressure of decisions that must be
made on matters only remotely connected
with scientific fundamentals.
A central bank operates in the markets for
credit, and there is an inevitable tendency
for it to conduct its analysis and formulate
and rationalize its policies in terms of how
they affect credit markets. There is an
equally inevitable tendency for economists
who get involved in central bank policy-
making to think and talk in the same terms,
if only to be able to communicate and com-
mand attention. As the Brunner-Meltzer
study shows, for example, the prevalence of
the free-reserve concept in Federal Reserve
thinking is intimately associated with the
necessity of formulating and communicating
decisions to be implemented by the Manager
of the System Open Market Account.
What internal institutional arrangements
in the central bank would suffice to prevent
this I cannot say: any major improvement
in the theory of policy adopted by the bank
is likely to harden into a dogma offensive
to subsequent theorists, as indeed happened
to the Riefler theory. Perhaps the best that
can be hoped for is that more active and sus-
tained criticisms by academic economists
will accelerate the rate of adoption of the-
oretical innovations.
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